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This paper examines some of the ways in which the Black other, by Frantz
Fanon’s articulation, complicates and challenges Emmanuel Levinas’s
philosophies of ethics and justice. Additionally, it brings Levinas’s notion
of the il y a, or “there is,” and Fanon’s “zone of nonbeing” into critical
conversation with respect to the body and being of the Black other.

When “there is” a Black:
Levinas and Fanon on
Ethics, Politics, and
Responsibility
Leswin Laubscher
Duquesne University

Each of us is guilty before everyone for everyone,
and I more than the others.
(Levinas, 2004, p. 146)

No one has clean hands; there are no innocents
and no onlookers.
(Fanon, 1968, p. 199)
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One can safely assert that Emmanuel Levinas
is widely regarded as the foremost contemporary “philosopher of the other and of ethics.”
Much less “widely regarded,” though in our
opinion no less “foremost,” we would claim
like eminence for Frantz Fanon, “philosopher
of the (Black) other and of ethics.” A core
tension is already prefigured in the rhetorical
manner of our presentation above, by the
modification of a phrase with the addition
of “Black” in brackets. Indeed, some may
register an early objection: Levinas, such
an objector might say, is articulating an infinite, transcendent and metaphysical ethical
responsibility of and towards the human,
while Fanon is concerned with a totality,
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and the ontological betrayal (an “after”) of
such (a “prior”) responsibility in a material
present and presence. As such, they are really
concerned with “separate” or “different” philosophical moments. This is a position and
argument we will interrogate and contest.
By the unfortunate constraints of space,
we will forego a thorough biographical and
intellectual overview of Levinas and Fanon’s
lives and thought, requisite as it nonetheless
is to a fuller understanding of our argument,
and theirs.1 Even so, a few “topographical”
comments may be in order as an initial and
orienting bird’s eye view of sorts to converging and diverging lines of life and thought. For

Anchoring texts for Levinas’s thought would be Totality and Infinity (2013) and Otherwise than Being
(2004), while for Fanon, the reader would be well advised to read Black Skin, White Masks (1967) and
The Wretched of the Earth (1968). As for biographies, Solomon Malka (2006) and Francois Poirie’s
extensive interview (In Levinas, 2001b) provide good overviews of Levinas’s life, while Macey (2012) and
Cherki (2006) do the same for Fanon.
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a small overlapping period between Fanon’s
regrettably short, and Levinas’s fortunate
long lives, there was a time when they shared
physical residency in France, and their scholarly activities overlapped. Yet, they never
met, and it is unclear whether either read the
other’s work [a copy of Levinas’s Existence and
Existents (2001a) was found in Fanon’s library,
after his death, but it is uncertain whether he
read it – there are no references to Levinas in
any of his published works]. The difference
in professional careers – a philosopher and a
psychiatrist – notwithstanding, both Levinas
and Fanon shared a scholarly lineage and
interest, most notably in their engagement
and transforming dialogue with phenomenology and existential phenomenology.2 One
could also chalk up similarity in the assertions
that both were concerned with the other, and
with subjectivity in the movement between a
totality, “here below”, and the elsewhere of an
infinity – a movement which, for both, also
included the absolutely fundamental (even
radical) consideration of the body. Even
their respective writing styles were similarly
employed less to explain or provide a philosophical system than to perform the conceptual; to present an unsayable “experience,”
and well in a profoundly affective, and often
poetic and enigmatic, manner. Laubscher et
al. (2021, p. 5) describe Fanon’s writing as “…
an eminently rigorous and exemplary scholarship which nonetheless speaks in lyrical

Yet, it is also true that there is always an
excess, always more, and that any statement
of similarity immediately buckles and gives
way to difference and deferral. Both Levinas
and Fanon were French subjects, for example,
fought and sacrificed under the banner of the
tricolore during World War II3, and whereas
one could even say that they both suffered
as “others” to France, “… Levinas as a Jew
and Fanon as a black subject under French
colonialism” (Prabhu, 2012, p. 127), the raced
and colonized experience of that subjection
for Fanon was of a sort that banalized all
pretensions to simple similarity and the
comparative equality of men4. One could say
that both Fanon and Levinas are ultimately
concerned with an ethics of responsibility,
so emblematically captured by the respective
epigrammatic quotes to this article. However,
if the marching orders sound similar, the soldiering step and the battle for life will betray
rather different stakes.

The Ethical and Ethics, Politics and
the Political
Saying that Levinas was far less interested in
questions of politics than of ethics seems an

2

Of course, in the manner of small degrees of separation, Levinas and Fanon were also “connected”
through the relationships each respectively had with others – both Levinas and Fanon had individual and
personal relationships with Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, for example, and one cannot but wonder whether
the other’s name came up in such social and/or private conversations.
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Levinas served in the Tenth Army, forced to surrender early in the war, upon which he was sent to a prisoner-of-war camp near Fallingbostel, in Germany. While his camp was a segregated one, containing only
Jews, he was nonetheless shielded from extermination by the Nazis’ strange observance of the protocols
of the Geneva convention of 1929 regarding prisoners of war. Frantz Fanon served in the Free French
Army, actively participated in the battles of Alsace, was wounded and received the Croix de guerre for
heroism in combat.

4
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prose and transcendent poetry, able to reach
an affective heart and an animating soul even
as it does a thinking ego”. Much the same can
be said of Levinas.

Clearly “human being” could be used here, but I’ve retained the gendered pronoun to align it with the
specific reference to Fanon and Levinas. Elsewhere in the paper, unless the quote is specifically so
rendered, I use more inclusive gendered referents.
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easy, even uncontroversial, characterization.
He appears, Drabinski (2011, p. 1) writes, “utterly unaware of and unconcerned with the
accusing face of the political,” while Caygill
(2000, p. 6) finds Levinas’s “critical neglect of
the political dimension … surprising,” especially given his closeness to the “convulsions
of twentieth-century political history” and
as the philosopher “most directly touched”
by such history (p. 6). We would be sorely
mistaken, though, if we are led to believe
that Levinas has nothing, or little, to say,
imply, or offer politics and/or the political.
He, for example, studiously and deliberately
avoided any direct mention or philosophical
examination of the Holocaust/Shoah, but
the “presentiment and memory of the Nazi
horror” suffuses his oeuvre as it “dominated”
his life (Levinas, 1997, p. 291). Politics and the
political also permeate and percolate in the
recurring references to justice, war, tyranny,
morality5. Additionally, though, Levinas
did comment on international and political
events in several interviews. Some of those
comments were rather unfortunate, unsavory
and/or downright horrible6. Finally, some authors have argued, rather convincingly, that
Levinas’s so called Jewish/Talmudic and/or
“confessional writings” (which he took great
pains to keep separate from his philosophical
work, even to the point of using a separate
publisher) contain a rich source for an
analysis and understanding of the political,
and that it – as such – should really be read
alongside the philosophical (see Alpert, 2015;
Anderson, 2017; Eisenstadt, 2003). It thus seems

that, between saying Levinas does not say
much of anything about the political because
his focus is on transcendence and the ethical,
on the one hand, or that everything he says
about responsibility to the other bears upon
the social relationship and the political (even
if, or inclusive of, politics as problem), on the
other, there is a much more complicated and
nuanced space for exploration.
By way of a brief recapitulatory step, for
Levinas, the ethical precedes the encounter
with an other, as an infinite and transcendent “condition” of possibility for the finite
and materialized “actual” encounter of the
singular self with a singular other. This ethical responsibility for the other is anarchic,
diachronic, imposed, asymmetrical, and an
irrefusable obligation; as such it is not a function of any historical attribute, psychological
quality, or sociopolitical context. It is there
before, or more precisely, outside (an-archic)
history and time, and before the appearance
of the other as such; before culture, and before one notices the color of her eyes, or the
hue of his skin. In fact, if one does notice the
eyes, or the shape of the nose, one has entered
into the spatial and the ontological, into
comparison and adequation, engaged as one
is in an appropriation into categories, schemas, and a totalizing same. Which is not to
say that one can exhaust the other’s alterity –
s/he remains infinitely foreign. The face both
“calls forth” and “tears itself away” from presence: One sees a face that can be described in
material, categorical, and featured presence

5

The powerful first lines of Totality and Infinity may serve as evidentiary reference par excellence: “Everyone will readily agree that it is of the highest importance to know whether we are not duped by morality.
Does not lucidity, the mind’s openness upon the true, consist in catching sight of the permanent possibility of war?” (Levinas, 2013, p. 21).

6

There is always a tricky tension between the writer and the work, the pronouncements and life of the
writer and the message and mission of the writing, within which our search for conflict and/or correspondence needs a delicate and insightful scholarly hand. Too few scholars, in our view, have theorized this
tension, and fewer still have done so well. A few noteworthy exceptions are Bernasconi (2005), Drabinski
(2011), Maldonado-Torres (2012), Eisenstadt (2012).
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– one with brown eyes, flattened lips, and
a bulbous nose – but such features assume
meaning not in terms of itself, as much as it
does in relation to other eyes and noses and
lips. Which is to say to categories in a system
of spatial and temporal relations [“vision
moves into grasp” (Levinas, 2013, p. 191)]. The
fact remains that the singular face cannot
be exhausted by “seeing,” and “knowledge”
of vision as the signifying expression of the
face “…is uncontainable … leads you beyond
… makes it escape from being, as a correlate
of knowing” (Levinas, 1982a, p. 87). Politics and
the political would be such a comparison and
adequation in which the singularity of the
individual call and command is lost to the
general and the law. By extension, to see a
Black face or a woman in racism and sexism
would be to betray the responsibility of the
ethical call in totalizing, systematic violence;
“the ethical exigency is not an ontological necessity” (p. 86), Levinas reminds us, such that
the “malignancy of evil” is a possible response
to a face “…dominated by perception,” even if
it “… cannot be reduced to that” (p. 86).
The ethical is, quite simply put, “first
philosophy” from which all else (including
politics and “political philosophy”) flows.
Politics and the political comes “after”; it is
already a “falling away” from the transcendent and infinite ethical demand into the
totalizing and economic rule of law and
accounting (economy), a movement from
singularity to homogeneity, mutuality, and
reciprocity. For it to apply “equally,” or
“fairly,” the political law has to be blind
to the particular individual, which, by the
assumption of reciprocity, “… no longer
involves generosity” (Levinas, 1999, p. 101) as
much as it does calculation and exchange.

7
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Whereas there are some subtle differences
and shifts of emphases in Levinas’s conception of justice (and the political) between
Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being,
it is, for the most part, the presence of the
third party “other than the neighbour but
also another neighbour and also a neighbour
of the other” which modifies and “widens” my
responsibility in “the birth of the question:
What do I have to do with justice?” (Levinas,
2004, p. 157)

The response, as serious and committed
as it is, or needs to be, is nonetheless in the
orbit of an ontology, and within a temporal
and contextual presence; one in which the
third, the neighbor of my neighbor, is of a
distance that does not quite have the power
to eviscerate me in the responsibility of the
ethical infinite (Eisenstadt, 2012) incumbent
on the face-to-face of the two. “To the
extravagant generosity of the for-the-other is
superimposed a reasonable order … of justice
through knowledge” (Levinas, 1996, p. 169). As
such, for it to nonetheless gesture towards
the ethical good, for it to retain some measure of the infinite saying in the political said,
politics must be premised on the “firstness” of
the ethical, and on “diachronic” justice that
“passes by justice” and is “more ancient” than
justice (Levinas, 2004, p. 158), a law that passes
beyond laws (Levinas, 2013)7. Ethics cannot
itself legislate for society or produce rules of
conduct; it is “dis-interestedness,” which is
not indifference, but a form of vigilant passivity to the call of the other which precedes
our interest in being.
Some rather well known scholars and
philosophers have taken such Levinasian
views on justice and the political to criti-

A simpler, albeit perhaps polemical, way of restating this sentiment may be to say that Levinas wishes the
(western/european philosophical) knowledge of Athens be informed and even relativized by the (western/
european biblical) wisdom of Jerusalem.
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cal task8, but it is to Drabinski (2011), and
Bernasconi (2005) that we turn briefly, both
because they set the scene for Fanon well,
and because they espouse a respectful wish
not altogether dissimilar from ours: to pose
Levinas’s very questions back to Levinas
in the service of a “thought different from
what can be found in his writings” (Bernasconi, 2005, p. 6), perhaps even to “radicalize
Levinas” by uprooting some of the “… habits
of Levinas’s own thought” (Drabinski, 2012,
p. XIX)9. As such, Bernasconi questions the
approach of the other outside of culture,
arguing that to do so is to repeat and perpetuate a violent and abstract humanism
that “reduces the other to nothing more than
a man” (2005, p.17). To argue a face without
characteristics, and a non-particular, “abstract,” trans-individual universal “humanity”
– even by the radical proposition of this face
as ethically prior to the I - is effectively to
argue a white, male, European face. The
Black who attempts to live thus, “simply as
a human being … soon discovers that to do
so calls for living simply as a white” (Gordon,
2005, p. 4). It is possible, now, to levy the
argument that, “despite every appearance to
the contrary, Levinas' philosophy is politics
in the purest sense” (Froese, 2019, p. 7). For
Fanon, the conquering and colonial European promise, to “become like me to be a
man,” is not only a false and impossible one

for the Black, inherently and foundationally
inassimilable to white Europe, but is also the
way in which Europe absolves itself precisely
from responsibility, from itself. Moreover,
Drabinski (2011) argues that Levinas allows
for two kinds of others – those who are near,
to whom I am kin, and responsible, and those
who “appear as radical and alien,” and who
could be an enemy (we revisit this suspicion,
later in the paper). As such, there opens up an
“epistemological distance” between a center
and a periphery, the latter of which waits
for a responsibility which does not arrive
(Froese, 2019). By this reading, the refrain of
Bernasconi’s question, who is my neighbour?,
may well render the philosophical answer of
(European) kin, kith, and the familiar and
proximate same.
Yet, there is also no denying that
Levinas’s account of justice is a thoughtful
and challenging one. We tend to think of justice as the pursuit of rights, as a question of
fair and equitable distribution of privileges,
and as a mirror to the state or institution’s
moral character. But by linking justice to ethics and responsibility, and providing it with
a rich and depthful philosophical grounding,
Levinas actually does more for the term than
we pay it common due: He shows how justice
is incumbent on each of us, and pulls the rug
out from under us when we shirk or otherwise

8

These include Eagleton (for whom the Levinasian focus is “self defeating and ineffectual” as it turns
politics into “… the problem, not the solution” (2009, p. 233), Zizek (for whom the Levinasian distinction
needs to be upended, in a choice “against the face, for the third” (2005, p. 183, emphasis in original), or
Reinhard (who also argues for a reversal, such that the political, in fact, “…is the condition of the ethical
… the two can only be created by passing through the three” (2005, p.49, emphasis in original).

9

Levinas himself, in the often contradictory or opaque style he is known for, provides ample ground for rereading and re-interpretation. For example, there is a nuanced shift from Totality and Infinity to Otherwise
than Being, in the emphasis on substitution and proximity in the latter. As such, Bloechl is able to argue,
with Levinas’s own words, that “The face is both the neighbor and the face of all faces” (Levinas, 2004, p.
160), or “The third looks to me in the eyes of the Other … It is not that there first would be the face, and
then the being it manifests or expresses would concern himself with justice” (Levinas, 2013, p. 213). As
such, “… in the human face, I am commanded by all the Others at once” (Bloechl, 2000, p. 143), and
“my obligation to my neighbor, no longer the abstract other, but a real person near me” (Alford, 2004,
p.164) is compelled by the third who was “there” “all along”.
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give to others – the police, the legislature,
the other who will vote – the responsibility
which is each of ours, singularly. Inasmuch as
I live an asymmetrical and infinite responsibility without content, and inasmuch as I am
elected and assigned to such responsibility in
a way that nobody else can answer for me,
responsibility in justice particularizes me,
accuses me, at every instant: “It is not the last
judgment that is decisive, but the judgment
of all the instants in time, when the living are
judged” (Levinas, 2013, p. 23). In this sense, his
is a radical and activist position, one in which
“I am called to act as a prophet in order to
call the State to greater justice, to respond to
the other beyond the call of law” (Wolff, 2011,
p. 26).

obligation to justice may be no less of a first
question than ethics, and “… all responsibility
has to be borne politically” (Wolff, 2011, p. 25).

Even so, Levinas’s justice requires the
visibility of faces, and the very fact of seeing,
notwithstanding his charge to see without
seeing. As a question of justice, what justice
is to me, it is a face that poses the question
to me. I am born to justice by someone who
“… has already presented himself … as a face”
(Levinas, 2013, p. 177). Hence, even conceding the question’s anarchic and diachronic
(non)address, outside of history and place,
as the question of the human (my humanity authorized), the addressee is in history
and the material present (my humanity
authored). The ethical call may precede the
self’s encounter with the other, but it is only
in the encounter with the other that the self
can be ethical. One is reminded of Derrida’s
quip with respect to Heidegger’s Dasein: that
Dasein is not human being, but neither is it
anything but. In a similar vein, the face of the
other is not the face that appears, but neither
is it anything but. Could we not argue, now,
that the Levinasian ethical command is (also)
political; that “… to welcome the widow, orphan, or stranger … is already implicated in a
political world” (Drabinski, 2011, p. 189). In fact,
by Levinas’s own formulation of the neighbor, there is no single aspect of existence
without the plurality of others, such that the

For there to be an ethical relation, there
has to be an (human) other, with a (human)
face. The fact of the matter is that the Black
does not appear as a human; he is “… the very
prototype of the animal … no more than a
‘body-thing’ … neither the substrate nor the
affirmation of any mind or spirit” (Mbembe,
2001, pp. 26-27). A “phobogenic object”, the
Black has no subjectivity, only materialized
objecthood and a canvas for the projections
of the white (Fanon, 1967). The Black enters,
not as a man, “… but a new type of man, a new
genus. Why, a Negro!” (Fanon, 1967, p. 116). As
one of an indistinguishable number, within
a swarm of nameless, faceless, Blacks, his
alienation is never his to bear, alone [Homi
Bhabha recounts an illustrative utterance to
an “innocent” Black man by the police, after
being manhandled: “well, you may not be
the criminal, but you look like him” (Bhabha,
2021)].

Perhaps no philosopher or scholar
makes this point as powerfully as Frantz
Fanon. It is fine and well for Levinas to say
that if one sees the shape of the face, the
droop of the eyes – and presumably the color
of the skin or the thickness of the lips – that
one is not seeing the face as transcendent
command. Racism would be a violence
against the other, and a betrayal of ethical
responsibility, if not humanity. Surely a laudable position, with nothing to find fault with,
except the assumption, Fanon reminds us,
that the Black appear as a man, as a human.

As an object, and without a face, the
Black is a being which issues no ethical command, cannot order or ordain. His appearance does not even solicit the ontological
resistance of murder, in the Levinasian pronouncement of the face that cannot be killed
inasmuch as killing is to totalize and grasp

MIDDLE VOICES VOL. II

completely what cannot be grasped. “The
Black man has no ontological resistance in
the eyes of the white man” (Fanon, 1967, p. 110)
such that the explanations and philosophies
of Europe must concede “… an impurity, a
flaw that outlaws any ontological explanation” (1967, p. 110) of the Black and colonized
man. “The European knows and does not
know” (Fanon, 1967).
Let us recall a pithy and concise definition of Levinas’s for the face: “The way in
which the other presents himself, exceeding
the idea of the other in me, we here name
the face” (2013, p. 7). The Black’s appearance
cannot be of this ex-cendent sort, from the
beginning. What appears, in the Fanonian
moment, is not the exorbitant Levinasian
human of the instant, outside of time or
place. Fanons Black is already there, having
appeared before he does, woven as he is
from myth, story, and history. His is not the
human of the instant, but the Black too late
on the scene. He does not make meaning for
himself, it is already there, before him: “I
cannot go to a film without seeing myself. I
wait for me …The people in the theater are
watching me, examining me, waiting for me.
A Negro groom is going to appear. My heart
makes my head swim” (Fanon, 1967, p. 140).
The appearance of the Black to the white is
pre-reflective and pre-linguistic [“… children
know that innocence is not black” (Sexton,
2015, p. 161)]. As such it is not a simple matter of phenomenological meaning making
in the face of the face, and for the Black,
politics is not a response to the presence of
the moment, but an always belated striving
for a freedom the “existentialists” presume as
an existential given, “prior” to the existent,
and Levinas for a hypostatic existent, made
“human” by the ethical command of the
other. The Levinasian two, when it involves
the black and the white, “… is just an occasion
for the reproduction of a relational mode
whose forms are already fixed, under conditions that traditional ontology is uncapable

of accounting for” (Macherey, 2012, p. 17). The
Black is unintelligible within the field of ontology (Warren, 2018), the lived experience of which
proves an ontological dehiscence which cannot,
consequently, be a simple falling away from
infinity as a political and ontological betrayal.
Between the colonizing white and the
colonized black there is a divide – they “reside in different zones of existence” (Anderson,
2017, p. 155). Fanon’s subject cannot attain to
the transcendence of the infinite other, and
the ethical imperative attendant upon such a
command, as he is only “recuperated into …
knowable selfhood through objectification”
(Prabhu, 2012, p. 130). The movement of the
Black is not between totality and infinity, but
between nothingness and infinity. Escape,
for the Black, is not from Being, as Levinas’s
(white) subject would have it, but from the
zone of nonbeing (and/or, as I will argue
later, from the il y a).
“I feel in myself a soul as immense as the
world, truly a soul as deep as the deepest of rivers, my chest has the power to
expand without limit. I am a master
and I am advised to adopt the humility
of the cripple. Yesterday, awakening to
the world, I saw the sky turn upon itself
utterly and wholly. I wanted to rise,
but the disemboweled silence fell back
upon me, its wings paralyzed. Without
responsibility, straddling Nothingness
and Infinity, I began to weep”. (Fanon,
1967, p. 140)

The body (politic)
It is a particular hallmark of both Fanon
and Levinas’s thought that they pay crucial
and fundamental attention to the body. For
Levinas, the body is both enchainment and
possibility. The existent is “riveted” to its
materiality – it does not exist as “spirit, or
as a smile or a breath of air” (Levinas, 1987, p.
55), but is encumbered and occupied by the

LESWIN LAUBSCHER
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solitude of a body which prevents the self
fleeing from itself, even as it “… accompanies
– necessarily – the upsurge of the subject in
its existent freedom” (Levinas, 1987, p. 56). The
body is the advent of consciousness - a concrete setting and localization. Consciousness
(“the freedom of the Ego”) and materiality
“go together” (Levinas, 1987, p. 57); the body is
“the condition necessary for any inwardness.
It does not express an event; it is itself this
event” (Levinas, 2001a, p. 70). More familiar to
us than any object in the world, we “…affirm
ourselves in the unique warmth of our bodies
long before any blossoming of the Self that
claims to be separate from the body” (Levinas,
1990, p. 68). It is never the case that we relate
to ourselves or the world without a body, so
that “to be truly oneself,” is to become aware
of, “and above all accepting” this “ineluctable
original chain” of the body to consciousness
(1990, p. 69). Levinas’s body is a human body,
and has no other attributes (with the minor
exception, perhaps, of Totality and Infinity, at
least in the sense of a starving or vulnerable
body). In fact, the one instance where Levinas
addresses a raced body (in the German use
of an “Aryan race”), is from the early (1934)
paper, Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism (Levinas, 1990), where he argues that the
German attempt to yoke a race to the body
(politic) is precisely to deny human freedom,
and the possibility of transcendence. It is to
awaken a “secret nostalgia” and an “elemental
evil,” a phrase we revisit later.
For Fanon, however, what Europe (and
Levinas) forgets, is that “the Negro suffers

in his body quite differently from the white
man” (Fanon, 1967, p. 138)10. For the Black,
his “body might not be what it should be,
the body of a man” (Khalfa, 2021, p. 48). In the
struggle for life, in the enchained upsurge
of its egoism, the Black does not discover a
soul, or experience the existential egoism of a
freedom to be. Sitting down next to a fire11, “I
… discover my livery for the first time … It is
indeed ugly” (Fanon, 1967, p. 114)12. Mere livery,
skin and flesh haunted and infected by a “corporeal malediction” which devastates a body
“proper to the human,” a general, human(istic) “corporeal schema” which assumes a
human position in the world, in space, and in
relation to the self in the world, cannot be for
the Black. Theirs is also to bear the crushing
burden of a “historico-racial schema” [the elements of which “had been provided for me …
by the other, the white man, who had woven
me out of a thousand details, anecdotes,
stories” (Fanon, 1967, p. 111)], and a “racial
epidermal schema” [by which “In the train, it
was no longer a question of being aware of
my body in the third person but in a triple
person. I was given not one but two, three
places” (Fanon, 1967, p. 112)].
There are a series of well-known experiments and “tests” in developmental psychology by which researchers mark whether
the child has a sense of itself and its body as
belonging, as its own. Known as “rouge tests,”
such a study might involve children playing
in a room with one or more mirrors, while a
researcher at some point unobtrusively places
a red dot (a splotch of coloring, a sticker) on

the child’s forehead (e.g. Amsterdam, 1972).
Upon encountering her reflection hereafter,
the child that has a sense of self (concept/recognition/awareness) will stop, perhaps with a
perplexed frown, reach up to the dot, maybe
even try to rub it off. They are aware that the
dot does not belong, is not (part of) them, is
other and alien. The Black’s whole body and
flesh is such a dot, ineradicable by the spit and
spittle of an ego, or a soul swiping left. Sealed
“into that crushing objecthood” by the white,
Fanon is “abraded into nonbeing” (p.109). The
very corporeality of the human that MerleauPonty (whom Fanon responds to, particularly)
– and, we argue Levinas as well – assumes is
“nullified and rendered naïve by the Black
experience” (Weate, 2021, p. 168).
In the return of the Black body, amputated, splayed, fragmented, and disfigured, he
is always “there,” never “here,” never at home,
never able to appear as “himself,” as “herself.”
The Black drives as black, enters the corporate boardroom as black, “enjoys” empty seats
beside him or her on a crowded bus, smiles
wryly as car doors are locked when he crosses
the pedestrian walkway, and gasps breathlessly under the knee on his neck. “‘Mama,
see the Negro! I’m frightened’” (Fanon, 1967,
p. 112).

The Il y a and the Zone of Nonbeing
The bulk of Levinasian scholarship focuses on
his so called mature works, Totality and Infinity,
and Otherwise than Being, bookends of sorts for
his innovative and radical thought of ethics
as first philosophy. Much less attention (in
general, but particularly so in psychology) is

paid to the early work, notably Existence and
Existents (2001) and Time and the Other (1987).
This should not be taken to mean that these
works were “surpassed,” or that Levinas came
to distance himself from it. In fact, quite
the opposite – he assumed the truth of that
early work as continuing backdrop to his
unfolding thought without having to revisit
it necessarily. It is to those early texts that we
turn for an articulation of the il y a, or “there
is”, and with which to bring Fanon and the
zone of nonbeing into dialogue.
The ontological difference, between
being and Being (or in Levinas’s rephrasing,
the difference between existent and existence), frame his project, particularly by
the reversal of the Heideggerrian emphasis
on anxiety and Dasein, to Levinas’s focus on
Being in general, and the emergence of the
existent in hypostasis, “where it is not a question of anxiety,”13 but of a horror before and in
existence. When the world disappears, “there
is” a bare existence that is not nothing. “This
impersonal, anonymous, yet inextinguishable
‘consummation’ of being, which murmurs in
the depths of nothingness itself we shall designate by the term ‘there is’” (Levinas, 2001a,
p. 52). Were one able to speak of the il y a as
an “experience,” it would be like night, which
“invades like a presence” but is not something,
nor is it no-thing; like night, “it” is an absent
presence which permeates, submerges, and
“invades” one, “full of the nothingness of everything” (2001a, p. 53). Furthermore, like the dark
silence that accompanies the child left alone in
his or her bedroom after the adults have shut
the door for the night, there is something
menacing about this indeterminate presence

10 In the text, this quote is directly addressed to Jean Paul Sartre, but I have taken the liberty to read a
metonymic Europe into it.
11 The suggestive reference here is likely to Descartes, whose body and soul emerges alongside his meditative and reflective fire. And, lest we forget, it is Descartes to whom Levinas turns for the inspirational
“double origin” of the cogito in the I and in God (or the Infinite). From this “simple” allusive reference,
Fanon challenges the very basis of both Descartes and Levinas’s insights.
12 In the Markmann translation, “uniform” is used instead of “livery”.
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13 The first, French, edition of Existence and Existents was sold with a red band over the cover, on which this
phrase was emblazoned, presumably a marketing alert to the prospective buyer of a contrary emphasis
to the prevailing Heideggerian: in a simplistic nutshell, if Heidegger’s interest is in the movement from
beings (existents) to Being (existence), Levinas would reverse this, for the way of truth from existence to
existents (De l’existence a l’existant), “where it is not a question of anxiety” (the English translation does
not quite pick up the French title’s suggestion of direction).
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(Baumgartner, 2005),

and of what may lurk
unseen in its fold, the “things that go bump
in the night.”14 “The rustling of there is … is
horror” (Levinas, 2001a), the “… name of a dark
and chaotic indeterminacy that precedes all
creativity and goodness” (Peperzak, 1997, p. 3).
Now, “to be conscious is to be torn away
from the there is, since the existence of a consciousness constitutes a subjectivity, a subject
of existence that is, to some extent, a master
of being, already a name in the anonymity of
the night” (Levinas, 2001a, p. 55). Consciousness
is the emergence of the I from the anonymity
of the “there is” to stake a place, a position,
a “here”; that is, to ex-ist, which is to come
forth and “take a stand” (ex- + sistere). Levinas
calls this positioning hypostasis, which, while
still before every act of understanding, as a
certain wakefulness, is nonetheless also the
advent of consciousness, whereby existence is
accomplished. The existent masters existence
in consciousness, but carries the weight of
existence by the same act and movement.
Put another way, whereas one “escapes” the
indeterminate horror of existence in consciousness, one never does; consciousness is
not the vanquishing hero whose victory is
realized in the instant of the decisive battle,
but rather the price of victory which inaugurates the burden and labor of rule. The price
of consciousness is the solitude of existence,
from which there is no escape.
But it is precisely that the existent desires
an escape from the menace and insecurity of
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its exposure to the indeterminacy of existence.
S/he wishes to escape the brute weight of
existence, to reach elsewhere, to a salvific
transcendence beyond solitude. We do not
have the space to review the ways in which
the existent attempts an escape from existence (for example, by the grasp of labor,
knowledge, possession, enjoyment, the dwelling, fraternity, and fecundity)15, but to say
that – with the exception, precisely, of fraternity and fecundity - the Black can stand in
as examples of appropriative use in each case
and attempt. We return to this point shortly.
There is a certain similarity, a rather
striking likeness, between the il y a and the
zone of nonbeing for the Black. By a contemporary reference, if not analogy or even
representation, the “sunken place” depicted in
the movie “Get Out” by Jordan Peele (2017),
vividly presents the experience of the Black
– not quite dead, nor living, thoroughly
encased within the body, put to utile service
for the white’s fuller enjoyment of life by the
Black’s “living” entombment in the sunken
place. We would be startled indeed to read,
alongside Peele’s depiction of the sunken
place, Levinas’s description of the there is, as
“… the place where everything has sunk away,
as a density of atmosphere” (Levinas, 1987, pp.
25-26).
If, now, the fact of Blackness, or the lived
experience of the Black16, is of a sort appropriate to the elemental il y a, a zone of nonbeing,
two questions impose themselves. Firstly,

does the Black appear as zombie, as a kind
of living dead non-human human, from the
il y a? Or is it that the Black is banished to the
il y a from the living present? Again, does the
Black, as the quintessence of horror and evil,
arrive as such from the il y a, a phobogenic
object as such, or is the Black banished to the
elemental, a creature of Dr. Frankenstein’s creation, “so hideous that even you turned from
me in disgust … my form … a filthy type of
yours, more horrid even from the very resemblance” (Shelley, 2021, p. 80)17. We may perhaps
fruitfully think of those two questions, if not
moments, in terms of the philosophical and
the psychological.

The Philosophical Moment: The
Black Emerges from the Il y a
We’ve already argued the appearance of
the Black as not quite human, and we’ve
referenced several scholars who have taken
Levinas to task for his insistence that the
existent who appears into existence is a universal human, “… free in his relations with the
world and the possibilities that solicit action
from him” (Levinas, 1990, p. 64). Extending the
mark of the beast, so to speak, to a broader
“non-European,” the Latin American philosopher, Enrique Dussel, writes that “Levinas
always speaks of the other as ‘the absolute
other’ … he has never though that the other

could be Indio, African, or Asian … Not
even Levinas has been able to transcend
Europe. We are the ones born outside, we
have suffered it” (Dussel, 1974)18. If, for Levinas, the European tension, such as it is, is
between Athens and Jerusalem, between the
Greeks and the Bible, he also presents it as
humanity’s tension: “I always say – but under
my breath – that the Bible and the Greeks
present the only serious issues in human life;
everything else is dancing …” (Levinas, 2001b, p.
149). Now, is it not possible that, “in alterity
we can find an enemy”? (Caygill, 2002, p. 1).
In an early paper, written shortly after
Hitler came to power, Levinas argues that
Hitler has awakened an “elemental feeling”
within the German populace, based as it was
on “primitive powers” (Levinas, 1990). What
connects this early essay and statements of
“dancing primitives” and “the asiatic peril”19
in the latter part of his life, is that these peoples are too attached “…to the elements, to
the earth, to the body. They cannot get out
of being.” (Alpert, 2015, p. 22). Like the pagan,
they lack transcendence and are bound to the
instinctual and a failure of ethical subjectivity – a failure that presumably also enabled
the horror of the Shoah. Hitler’s moment,
though, can be thought as a temporary failing, a historical aberration given that ethical
subjectivity, wrought by the yoke of Athens

17 Often forgotten or lost in translation, Mary Shelley’s full title, tellingly appropriate in so many ways to our
argument here, was Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus.
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Keep in mind that, by the analogy of night and day, the light of day cannot rid itself entirely of the pall of
night, as in dark alleys or basements, fleeting shadows in corners of parks, or in the recesses of woods
and bushes.
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See Existence and Existents, Time and the Other, but also Section II of Totality and Infinity, where the il y a
appears in the form of the elemental.

18 There is a simultaneously inspiring and disappointing connection between Dussel and Levinas, who knew
each other from their participation in an intensive seminar at Louvain, in 1972. “As a South American,”
Dussel asked Levinas if the “fifteen million Indians slaughtered during the conquest of Latin America, and
the thirteen million Africans who were made slaves” were as other to Levinas as the victims of Anti-Semitism (Dussel, 1999, p. 125). To which Levinas responded, “That’s something for you to think about” (pp.
125-126). Which Dussel did, in his “Liberation Philosophy,” which transforms Levinas’s absolute alterity
to proximate exteriority, to a philosophizing from the position of the damned. It is abundantly clear that
Dussel is as inspired and informed by Fanon as he is by Levinas.

16

“The Fact of Blackness” is how that most famous chapter 5 of Black Skin White Masks is titled, but also
one which has drawn quite vocal ire from some scholars as an erroneous translation. The more correct
rendition, they argue, would be “The lived experience of the Black”. For our purposes here, both versions
are actually quite apropos.

19 Caygill (2002) analyzes and lists a range of such statements from various essays and interviews, for
example of “innumerable masses advancing out of Asia”, or the “yellow peril” which is “not racial, it is
spiritual” and whom eschews a “radical strangeness” where “Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob no longer mean
anything” (pp. 182-194).
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and Jerusalem, is precisely Europe’s gift of
humanity, Europe’s disjoining of spirit from
body, making room as such for transcendence [Levinas argues thus in another early
paper, from 1935, On Escape (Levinas, 1982b)].
It is not our intention (well, not primarily)
to “trot out” these statements to the end of
“moralizing gasps” (Drabinski, 2011, p. VI), but
(also) to question how these statements are
betrayed in the philosophy itself. As such,
may we read Levinas to suggest that there
are others, other others, whose alterity does
not quite evoke an ethical command, their
appearance being “radically strange,” lacking as they do, a “sacred history,” and being
too closely beholden to “instinctual passions,” rendering them incapable of ethical
transcendence and subjectivity. Not quite
capable yet of excendence in hypostasis from
the elemental, “They cry in another way” 20
(Emmanuel Levinas, 2001b).
We can play with, and develop, this idea
even further. If the face contains the trace of
the infinite, there needs to be a translation
of this Saying into a Said (by the later, most
mature version of the ethical moment, in
Otherwise than Being), one which - by Levinas’s
own admission - contains a betrayal and treason. Hence, Levinas avers, everything needs to
be continually “unsaid”. But can’t one argue,
then, that the ethical action is always already
premised on betrayal. If everything needs to
be unsaid, in and by a constant unsaying,
the only means for which is in ontology, in
action, in the social, for Levinas to say that
“politics left to itself bears a tyranny in itself”
(Levinas, 1984, p. 66) may well be to misplace
the treasonous moment: politics as tyranny
may well be an extension/expression/disfigurement not of itself, but of the aporetic
betrayal at the heart of translation. The very
metaphysical command of responsibility

already carries betrayal, already carries the
mark of its betrayal; goodness is already sullied. The Saying, for it to have any meaning,
is premised on treason, is - from the beginning - “compromised” by an auto-immune
“impurity”. Rather than a betrayal of the
pure infinite in the totalizing here below, the
infinite already comes impure, as love does,
and as the caress is only that because it can
also grasp.
Levinas’s transcendence is a transascendance, to the infinite of the otherwise than
being. He clarifies his indebtedness to Jean
Wahl for this term, and he uses it in a way
always associated with an ascendant reaching to an infinite elsewhere, “above”. Fanon
also uses the term transcendence, and eerily
enough, also acknowledges, in a footnote, his
debt to Wahl [“between the white man and
me there is irremediably a relationship of
transcendence” (Fanon, 1967, p. 138)]. In Fanon’s
hands, though, to the elsewhere “above,” there
is an elsewhere “below,” a transdescendence
of social death and civiliter mortuus [a legal
term, meaning a civil death, applied to the
convict who, by his transgression, dies to
civil rights and “… his estate, if he has any, is
administered like that of a dead man” (Weier,
2014, p. 421)]. At the very instance of creation, the Black bears the mark of creation’s
violence. The Black is black before the will,
faceless not by the movement of an ego; a
natal alienation. If ontology is, in Levinas’s
description, an “indispensable ancillary,”
a servant, to ethics, it may well be less that
the servant performs the master’s command
ineffectually, or betrays it in a less than able
manner, than that the master’s command is
already treasonous.
Would Levinas himself concede a
reading as above? Probably not, but then he

20 Levinas refers here to televised images of Black South Africans “dancing” at a funeral.
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also writes, in a prefatory note (in 1990) to
the republication of his essay on Hitlerism,
which we referenced above, that there is “…
the essential possibility of elemental Evil
… inscribed within the ontology of a being
concerned with being” (Levinas, 1990, prefatory
note), and against which Western philosophy
needs to insure itself by not forgetting its
allied, sacred imperative.

The Psychological Moment: The
Black is Returned to the Il y a
Levinas was famously skeptical of, and resistant to, psychology. It even seems that he
studiously and deliberately avoided reading
Freud, for example, let alone engage with
psychoanalysis in his thinking. We argue,
though, that if one was to accept Levinas’s
conception of justice, and of racism as a betrayal of the ethical imperative, the processes
of this operation can only be understood
more fully by recourse to psychology.
The things of enjoyment come from a
background and return to it, Levinas says.
The existent appropriates, works over,
and satiates itself in existence; s/he crafts a
home, with windows and a door as bulwark
and edge to the ever present threat of the
elemental, which continue to gnaw at the
window panes and rattle the doors of the
dwelling. The terror of the elemental is kept
at bay by knowledge and labor, which is to
turn objects into use. The Black fulfills this
function splendidly - the relation with the
black is not an ethical one, but a functional
one. Yet, lest one forgets, to the mastery of
the elemental there is also the enjoyment of
life. The elemental is to be worked over, to
be sure, but also to be enjoyed. The burden
of existence demands as much of the ego and
reason to fashion an edge onto the elemental
as it does a heart and affect with which to
master its threat and terror. The whole psychological apparatus thus falls into place in
the dynamics of projection, fantasy, death

anxiety, psychoanalysis, and any number
such explanations. “Ontologically pliable …
a thing to be scripted in the inverse image
of whiteness” (Yancy, 2005, p. 222), the Black
is conjured and formed into “a niggerized
body,” the processes by which this branding
occurs having been, and continuing to be,
theorized from within psychology already.
Fanon himself has certainly done yeoman’s
work in this regard already – lest we forget,
of the black-white relation in the colony,
“… only a psychoanalytical interpretation …
can lay bare the anomalies of affect that are
responsible for the structure of the complex”
(Fanon, 1967, p. 10), albeit, we hasten to add, a
psychoanalysis and psychology rooted in the
socius as much as the psyche.

Finally …
Clearly the two moments we’ve highlighted
above serve a heuristic purpose. The point is
precisely that those two moments are really
to be thought together. For example, the
emergence from the il y a (or from the elemental unconscious) happens in time, where
the black is already ontologically closed (off)
from the call of love. That is, even if Levinas’s
eschatology is not of some teleological future
(where racism is eradicated and educational
programs will have prepared an egalitarian
society where we can live in the judgment
of our character), but rather “a disturbance
or interruption of the present”, the instant
cannot but include the faceless, non human
Black who has already, in the hypostatic separation from the il y a, attained passage into
existence by a structural, philosophical, and
psychological betrayal. If the instance of the
instant, the verb of the to do, involves translation, as it must, it is already wholly suffused
with time and history. And “if the third party
was absent from the face to face, in the face
of the Other I would be absolved from all my
commitments and obligations to everyone
else. Because the third party is already located
within the face to face, the passage from
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ethics to politics is immanent.” (Bernasconi,
1999, p. 76). There is, consequently, “… no time
before the question of justice” (Wolff, 2011, p.
153), and if the messianism of the saying is
of such an aporetic, then the only task is of
a working in the present, which is to say a
politics.
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There is certainly much to learn from
Levinas, and great fruitfulness in the exercise
that poses Levinas’s questions back to Levinas.
But even more, we hope to have illustrated,
by putting Fanon’s questions to Levinas, by
bringing the colony (which, Fanon teaches
us, is a structure, not a geography) and the
Black to Levinas’s neighborhood. To Athens
and Jerusalem, also the traveler from Great
Zimbabwe.
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